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This paper is an investigation of the Bank of England's actions under
the gold standard in the decades immediately preceding World War I. In
particular, I use monthly data on Bank reserves, domestic activity, price
changes, and gold inflows from the late 1880s to mid-1914 to determine
which variables the Bank reacted to.
The years from 1870 or 1880 until 1914 are frequently regarded as a
halcyon period in international monetary relations. Several financial
crises occurred (in 189O-the Baring crisis-and in 1893 and 1907), but
throughouttheperiodthe majorcentral bankswere abletomaintain gold
convertibility of their currencies. Had war not intervened in 1914, the
system might have operated reasonably well for decades longer.
At the center of the system was London (Lindert 1969 describes its
importance), and at the center of the London financial community was
the Bank of England. Actually, in 1914 the Bank was still a private
profit-making institution; however, it had for a century and more in-
creasingly taken onquasi-official functions. AfterWalterBagehot'spub-
lication of Lombard Street in 1873, the Bank's position as central bank
had become widely recognized and accepted. Because of London's key
position in the international financial community, the Bank at that time
was clearlytheforemost centralbankoftheworld-arole thathas special
interest for anyone studying the international financial system.
John Dutton is assistant professor of economics at North Carolina State University,
Raleigh, North Carolina.
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A salient feature of that international financial system is its apparent
stability. Bloomfield (1959) points out that exchange rates among coun-
tries on gold were essentially unchanging; devaluations were a rarity.
Implicitly, balance-of-payments problems were not the disrupting in-
fluence they came to be under the Bretton Woods system. Admittedly
some economies may have experiencedgreaterinstabilitywith respect to
certainmeasuresofprices andoutputthanafterWorldWarII (see Bordo
1981 for statistics for the United States and the United Kingdom);
nonetheless, the international aspects of the system were stable.
Analysts ofthe pre-1914 erahave stressed two explanations ofinterna-
tional stability. In the short run, if trade imbalances developed (caused
perhaps by exogenous shocks), capital would flow in the opposite direc-
tion. This capital counterflow would take place because of the effects of
gold flows onmoney supplies and interest rates. In the United Kingdom,
according to the descriptive literature (e.g., Clapham1970; Sayers 1976),
such interest-rate effects were produced by central-bank authorities. Of
course, changedflows ofcapital in response to interest-rate changes were
primarily stock-adjustment processes and therefore inherently tempo-
rary. For this reason capital flows are not a satisfactory explanation of
long-termflow adjustment. Once any capital stock adjustment had taken
place and capital stopped moving, the outward gold flows caused by the
original trade imbalance would reappear.
A second explanation of long-term adjustment was the Hume price-
specie-flow mechanism. According to that explanation, international-
payments imbalances resulted in money-supply changes in the countries
involved. These in turn caused prices to change (upward in the country
receiving gold, downward in the country losing gold), and these price
changes altered the international flow of goods in such a way as to
eliminate the initial trade imbalance.
Although it does not appear in analyses of international adjustment
before World War I, after the war the phrase "rules ofthe gold standard
game" was applied to a prescriptionfor a specific central-bank role in the
adjustment process. According to the "rules," central banks had the
important role of facilitating international-payments adjustment, either
by reinforcing the effects ofpayments imbalances on the domestic econ-
omy so as to speed the adjustment process, or at least by not hindering
those effects. According to one definition of the rules articulated by
Bloomfield (1959 pp. 47-48):
A discount rate and credit policy ... was supposed . . . to have the
effect ofincreasing central·bank holdings ofdomestic income-earning
assets when holdings ofexternal reserves rose, and ofreducing domes-
tic assets when reserves fell. In this way, the effectofchangesin central
bank reserve holdings on the domestic credit base would be magnified
by central bank action.175 The Bank of England and the Rules of the Game
Bloomfield mentions that Nurkse (1944) applied this definition to the
period between the world wars and found that during that period central
banks in general did not follow this form ofthe rules. Bloomfield himself
applied the definition to annual data in the 1880-1914 period. He com-
puted the number of times international and domestic interest-earning
assets ofeach central bank moved together, indicating rules compliance,
and moved in opposite directions, indicating rulesviolation. Hefound for
all the observations covered a compliance rate of 34 percent and a
violation rate of60 percent, with the remainder being cases ofno change.
The comparable figures for the Bank of England in Bloomfield's study
were 47 percent and 50 percent.
Pippenger's (1974) study uses a definition of the rules somewhat like
Bloomfield's. He regresses Bank of England monetary liabilities on the
Bank'sstockofgold during the 1890-1908 period and finds a positive and
significant relationship when data for periods ofa quarter and longer are
used, though not when the data are monthly. Pippenger's conclusion is
that the Bank responded to gold flows by changing the money supply in
the medium to long run but not in the short run. Such long-run behavior,
if the response were sufficient, would be in keeping with the rules.
Pippenger's coefficient for annual data indicates a bit less than a one-for-
one transmission.
Bloomfield notes in his description of the rules that the definition
quoted above is by no means the only one. Another possible definition,
which he does not explicitly mention, is that central banks refrain from
countercyclical domestic policy. Under the rules, central banks were
obligated to maintain the convertibility of their currencies. Given the
limited nature oftheir policy tools, that obligation would have left them
little capacity to pursue domestic stabilization. In addition, pursuitofthe
stabilization goal might well have interrupted the process of long-term
adjustment to eliminate payments imbalances.
Qualitative discussions provide mixed answers to the question of the
incidence of domestic countercyclical policy. Bloomfield (1959, p. 24)
himself says: "the view . . . of central banking policy as a means of
facilitating the achievement and maintenance of reasonable stability in
the level of economic activity and of prices was scarcely thought about
before 1914, and certainly not accepted, as a formal objective ofpolicy,"
but then he goes on to note increasing awareness and sensitivity on the
part of central banks to the domestic effects of their actions. Sayers
(1976) also notes some sensitivity ofthe BankofEngland to theeffects of
its policy on business conditions. Apparently, critics of the effects of
Bank policy on the domestic economy made their views known (see
Dornbusch and Frenkel, this volume). Mints (1945, pp. 188-89) cites
several writers of the pre-1914 period who decried those effects. Pal-
grave, writing in 1903, complains: "Great instability in the rate of dis-176 John Dutton
count is a veryprejudicialthing to the interestsofcommerce," andfavors
minimizing the transmission ofdisturbances from abroad to the domestic
economy ([1903] 1968, p. viii). Whether the Bank actually pursued
countercyclical policies or not, certainlythe possibility ofdoing so must
have been evident to its directors.
One problem in testing for Bank countercyclical policy is a possible
strong negative relationship between reserves and domestic activity.
Ford (1962, p. 21) points out that at cyclical peaks high import demand
mighthavecoincidedwithhighcapitalexports, with consequent demands
oncentral-bank reserves. Iflow reserves led to high Bankdiscount rates,
then the Bank might appear to be following a countercyclical policy
without actually doing so. Ford apparently believes the Bank-rate-
domestic-activity relationship to be such an indirect one, for he states,
"the Bank did not pursue a conscious contra-cyclical policy in its use of
Bank Rate" (1962, p. 34). Goodhart (1972, p. 199) presents evidence to
support the negative reserve-activity relationship. A regression he re-
ports ofthe balance-of-trade surplus on an activity variable for the 1890s
and early 1900s yielded a significant negative coefficient.
A possible test for separate effects of reserves, domestic activity, and
inflation onBankpolicy is to include all threein the equations estimated.
Dutton (1978) reports such a regression on Bank rate using annual data
for 1862-1913. Despite the presence of reserves as a control in the
equation, domestic activity, as measured by the rate of unemployment,
had a significant positive effect on Bank rate.
Anotherproblem in the interpretation ofthe effects ofdomestic activ-
ity involves the Bank'sprofits. Ifhigh activity led to high market interest
rates, the Bank might have raised its own discount rate as a way of
enhancing its profits. Such profit-motivated behavior might appear to be
countercyclical policy. It would be hard to discriminate between profit-
motivated and purely countercyclical Bank-rate policy. Most of the de-
scriptive literature takes for granted that profit was secondary to other
Bankpolicies. In this paperI assume that it was. Actually, ifBank policy
was countercyclical, whether for profitability reasons or otherwise, the
Bank would have broken the rules. The need to discriminate between
profitability and stabilization as motives may not be important in testing
for violations of the rules.
In the present study, I use monthly data available for several series
from the late 1880s to 1914 to find out how well Bank actions fit the rules
ofthe game. In doing so, I test for both countercyclical policy on the part
ofthe Bank (ignoringprofit motives) and for relationships betweenBank
holdings of non-interest-bearing reserves and interest-bearing domestic
assets. I expect to find, ifthe Bankfollowed the rules, thatit did not react
to domestic activity and inflation in its conduct ofpolicy. I also expect to
find, if the Bank followed the rules, that reserve changes and Bank177 The Bank of England and the Rules of the Game
interest-bearing assets moved together, indicating that the Bank did not
sterilize the effects of reserve changes on the money supply.
3.2 Specific Variables Considered
3.2.1 Policy Tools
The Bank of England's chief instrument of monetary control was its
discount rate, known as "Bank rate." According to Sayers (1976, p. 23),
"theaccepted doctrine bothinside and outside the Bankwas thatits most
important action was the fixing ofBankRate." Ofcourse, for Bank rate
to have an effect, it had to influence market rates of interest. Accord-
ingly, the Bank had to ensure that capital markets in London were
dependent on it for at least part oftheir funds. In fact, many commercial
concerns borrowed regularly from the Bank at Bank rate, or at rates
closely related to Bank rate. Consequently, during much of the period,
that rate constituted the opportunity cost of funds at the margin for
market participants. A great deal ofthe energies ofthose governing the
Bankwas expendedin makingsure atcertainkeytimesthatBankratedid
constitute that opportunitycost. "MakingBank rate effective" generally
involved the use ofothermore limited tools ofthe Bankto back up Bank
rate.
Altering the Bank's holdings ofinterest-earning assets-the tool used
frequently to "make Bank rate effective"-ean be thought ofas an early
form ofopen-marketoperations. To force marketparticipants to borrow
at Bank rate, the Bank would in one way or another gain command of
additional funds in the market. It did so at times by selling securities, at
other times by borrowing against its securities holdings, and at still other
times by selling consols spot and buying them forward. All of these
procedures removed funds from the market and eventually forced cus-
tomers to borrow from the Bank. How common these operations were is
difficult to say. Clapham notes their use as far back as the midnineteenth
century and earlier; he goes on to say that "in the seventeen years from
1873 to 1890 there are only four in which no market borrowing is done,
and in several the borrowings are repeated and complex" ([1944] 1970,
pp. 295-98). Sayers (1976, pp. 37-43), on the other hand, stresses the
relative infrequencyoftheseoperationsbefore 1890, though he describes
them as used with increasing frequency after that time (see also Morgan
1965 for a description of the practices involved).
A third instrument, in addition to Bank rate and altering the Bank's
portfolio, was use of the so-called gold devices. The Bank was required
by law to purchase gold with notes and to redeem notes with gold
sovereigns oncertainset terms ofexchange. However, the Bankwas free
to alter those terms somewhat in favor of persons bringing gold for178 John Dutton
exchange. It was also free to force its customers to follow the law's
conditions more or less exactly in presenting or seeking gold. Thus the
Bankcould draw more gold by making it more advantageous for custom-
ers to bring gold and more costly for them to remove it from the Bank.
These practices-lumped together under the name "gold devices"-had
the effect of increasing the spread between the gold points, the rates of
exchange at which gold could profitably be imported orexported. Sayers
(1953, 1976) describes these gold devices in some detail. Theiruse was in
a sense a violation ofthe rules, since the devices interfered with the free
convertibility of gold at clearly specified rates of exchange. They were
usually used to retain or attract gold without resorting to extreme Bank-
ratechangesthatwould otherwise be necessary. In this paperI ignore the
gold devices largely because I have no data series on their use. The
descriptive literature portrays them as a relatively minor part of Bank
policy.
The policy tool I focus on in the empirical work is Bank rate, since all
descriptions feature it as the principal embodiment ofpolicy. Bank-rate
information is available in weekly form from several sources, including,
for the period 1888 to 1909, a very useful U.S. National Monetary
Commission statistical volume (1910). Following Goodhart (1972), I use
for each month the Bank rate in effect at the beginning of the month.
I also use aform ofthesecondpolicytool, theBank'sprototypeform of
open-market operations. The U.S. National Monetary Commission
volume contains information on Bank holdings ofgovernment securities
and otherdomestic interest-bearing assets. As a securities-holdings vari-
able, I use the reportedholdings ofall such assets at the beginningofeach
month.
3.2.2 Target Variables
By all accounts, the Bank of England devoted a large share of its
attention to ensuring the adequacy of the liquid reserves in its Banking
Department. Those reservesformed thebaseofthecreditstructurein the
United Kingdom. As a result of its lending, the Banking Department's
liabilities were generally two or three times its reserves. Some of those
liabilities were deposits of the government or of customers of the sort a
commercial bank might have. Others, however, were "bankers' bal-
ances," and as such constituted a large part of the reserves of the com-
mercial-banking system. Thus any unusual demand for money anywhere
in the U.K. economy or from abroad was likely to end up quickly as a
demand on the Bank. Only the Banking Department's reserves were
available in normal times to meet that demand. Generally the gold
reserves in the other half of the Bank, the Issue Department, were
considerably larger than Banking Department reserves; however, that179 The Bank of England and the Rules of the Game
gold was by law (the Bank Charter Act of 1844) only to be given up in
return for BankofEngland notes. Gold held for backing notes not in the
hands of the Bank was unavailable for meeting a money demand. Of
course thatgold was physically within the countryandtherefore available
for emergency use in meeting a demand from abroad. In fact, the 1844
law governing Bank behavior with respect to gold was suspended by a
special letter from the cabinet on rare crises occasions. (See Dornbusch
and Frenkel, this volu~e, on the 1847 crises in which domestic liquidity
demands supervened on foreign gold demands.) The Bank and govern-
ment, however, were highly reluctant to suspend the law; for essentially
all purposes, then, the Bank's available reserve was that of the Banking
Department. For the purposes of this paper, therefore, I use Banking
Departmentreserves as a variableindicatingthe Bank'sabilitytomeetits
liabilities, including its obligation to provide gold in return for its bank
notes. I also use anotherwidely watchedindicatorofreserve position, the
"proportion." Theproportionwas the ratio ofreserves to liabilities ofthe
Banking Department. It was of course closely related to the level of
reserves. Eitherofthese variables, iftheyact as expected, should demon-
strate a significant inverse relationship to Bank rate in the empirical
work. As reserves and/ortheproportiondropped, Bankrate shouldhave
risen. Insome equations areserve-changevariablewill beusedwith Bank
securities-holdings changes. In that case, if the Bank adaptedits interest-
bearing asset-holdings to reinforce the effects of changes in reserve
holdings, in accordance with the rules, then the measured relationship
should be positive.
In the description ofthe rules above, I mentioned the rules interpreta-
tion that would prohibit a countercyclical reaction ofthe Bankto domes-
tic activity and prices. The empirical work described below tests for such
reactions. On an annual basis, estimates of gross domestic product are
available for years quite a bit earlier than those covered in this study.
However, on a monthly basis they do not exist. I therefore employ
proxiesfor domesticactivity. Goodhart (1972) collected and used railway
freight receipts, which were available by month back to the early 1890s. I
have borrowed that series for this work. As an alternative I also use an
unemployment-rateseriesoriginallycollectedfrom tradeunions. Neither
series is a perfect proxy for domestic activity. The railway-receipt series,
of course, is unduly representative of certain sectors of the economy.
Since it is a revenue series, it reflects not only quantity movements but
price movements. The unemployment series applies only to a subset of
workers, those in trade unions. In addition that subset altered as the
number of trade unions reporting increased. Despite these limitations I
employ the two series to test for Bankreactions. IftheBankfollowed the
rules, then Bank rate should not respond to them.
The rate of inflation, like domestic activity, should not have affected180 John Dutton
Bankrate ifthe Bankfollowed the rules. I have computed a monthly rate
ofinflation basedon a crude wholesale price index collected by Augustus
Sauerbeck.
Another variable I use, gold inflows, will serve as an indicator of
internationallyinduced money movements. In some ways a gold inflow is
like a positive movement in reserves. Therefore, I enter it in some
versions ofthe securities-holdings equation to see if the Bank responded
togoldflows ratherthanto changesin its own reserves. Unfortunatelythe
data on gold flows are poor. Goodhart (1972) presents two monthly
series, one collected by the Bank and the other by the English Board of
Trade, both purportedly measuring the same thing. The two series are
quite different, indicating that one or the other or both are defective. I
have chosen to include gold flows, despite the limitations of the data. I
use the Bank of England series; presumably the Bank would use that
series, if it used any, to govern its behavior.
3.3 Modeling and Estimation
The question posed is: What variables did the Bank of England react
to? Toanswerit I treattheBank'spolicytools as dependentvariables and
regress them on several variables to which the Bank might have re-
sponded. Ofcourse, any response is founded on a beliefby the Bankthat
its tools in turn would affect these variables. The process offeedback of
targetvariables to the actions ofa policy authority is discussed by Sargent
(1979, chap. 15). As he notes, proponents of the recently developed
rational-expectations hypothesis tend to discount the effectiveness of
systematically applied policy tools in influencing economic events. The
argument is that individuals and firms, if they come fully to anticipate
policy reactions, will take compensatory actions that will obviate the
effects of policy. If these analysts are right, then feedback processes,
being very regular and predictable, will be ineffectual in altering eco-
nomic events. As Sargent points out, however, a sufficient condition for
feedback policy responsesto workis greaterandmoretimelyinformation
availability to the policy authority. If such a condition holds, then indi-
vidual agents will be unable fully to anticipate and compensate for policy
actions; those policy actions as a result will have real effects on the
economy. In this paper, I assume that the Bank of England at least
believed its policy actions, includingthose determined by feedback rules,
to be effective. The appearance of any significant coefficients in the
feedback equation would bear out that assumption.
Forpurposesoftesting, theBankis assumed to reacteachmonthtothe
values of target variables for that month, or more strictly speaking, to
forecasts of target variables for that month. The feedback process is181 The Bank of England and the Rules of the Game
modeled in linear form, i.e., the policy-tool variable is treated as a linear
function of forecasts of the target variables.
Theforecasts, ratherthan the actual variables themselves, are usedfor
two reasons. First, it is unlikelythattheBankwouldhavefull information
about the most recent values of its targets at the time of undertaking
policy action. Second, the forecasts serve to eliminate problemsofsimul-
taneous-equationbias. Two-waycausalityis implicitin theformulation of
the model; policy actions influence targets, and targets, through the
feedback mechanism, influence policy actions. The second avenue of
causality is the one I test for. One way to reduce the chances ofdetecting
the first direction of causality and mistaking it for the second is to use
regressors that are predetermined at the time policy action is taken. In
this case, I use forecasts of the target values based on information from
previous months.
The ideal forecast series, of course, would be those actually used by
Bank officials. However, such series were likely never made completely
explicit, much less written down. Proxies for the forecast series must be
sought. One approach to forecasting used a great deal of late is that of
Box and Jenkins (1976). Topredicta variable, theyuse thepasthistoryof
the variable, including both past values of the variable itself and past
differences between the variable and its predicted value. The equations
fitted for forecasting are of the form:
Zt = <f>1Zt-l + <f>2Zt-2 + ... + <f>pZt-p + at - a 1at-l
- a2at-2 - ... - aqat - q,
where Zt is the variable at time t (or in some cases changes in the
variable), Zt_ i is the variable at time t - i, at is the prediction error at
time t, at_i is the prediction error at time t - i, and <f>i and a i are
parameters. The Zt-i terms form the autoregressive part of the process
and the at-i terms are denominated the moving average part. Usually p
and q are low numbers ranging from zero to two. Ifdifferencing is used,
the process is said to be integrated. The acronym ARIMA, for "autore-
gressive integrated moving average" is commonly used with these mod-
els. In much ofthe empirical work that follows, I use ARIMA models to
obtain forecasts for the target variables.
Several objections to this method of generating forecasts may be
raised. First, theBanklikelyusedinformationotherthana variable'spast
history in generating forecasts for that variable. It probably used other
variables, for example. Second, even if the Bank used only a variable's
past history in generating its forecast, it might have used a different
forecasting process than the equation estimated here. The forecasting
equation estimated for a variable in this paper is based on data covering
the whole period under consideration. At any given time, ofcourse, the182 John Dutton
Bank could have used only data preceding that time. If the pattern a
variable followed were stable over the whole period covered, as well as
over a suitably long preceding period, then the Bank in principle could
have used the forecasting equation used here. If, on the other hand, that
pattern were changing, then the equation I estimate here based on data
up to 1914 could not, even in principle, have been available to the Bank
before 1914. These considerations all imply that the forecast series are at
best quite imperfect proxies for the Bank of England's forecasts. The
problem can be viewed as one of errors in the variables. In such a case,
the observed coefficients will be biased towardzero, making detection of
any existing feedback less likely.
Earlier I mentioned the use of predetermined forecasts as a way of
eliminating simultaneous-equation bias. Unfortunately, use of those
forecasts does not eliminate another "back-door" route by which causal-
ity running in the "wrong" direction could be pickedup by the equations.
If the policy-tool variable is autocorrelated, i.e., if its value at time t is
correlated with its value at time t - i, then the possibility exists that any
results from regressing the policy tool at time t directly on the forecasts
couldsimply reflect relationshipsofbothwith the policytool attime t - i.
This problem, however, would notexist ifthe dependent variable at time
t were not correlated with its own previous values. One way to meet this
condition is to subtractfrom the dependentvariable thepartofit thatcan
be predictedfrom its own past. Forthis purpose, I use an ARIMAmodel
fitted to each dependent variable to generate predictedvalues, which are
then subtractedfrom the actualvalues. Theresiduals can be thought ofas
the innovations that occurred each period in the policy variable. The
innovations are uncorrelated with each other and therefore will not
evidence any spurious back-door relationships with the predetermined
target forecasts. This method should yield results reflecting causality
going only in the direction from target variables to Bank policy.
The equations fitted with this techinque are ofthe form at = X; ~ + Et,
where atis the time t residual in the ARIMAequationfor the policy tool,
Xt is a vector of forecasts of the target variables, ~ is a vector of coef-
ficients, and Et is the error at time t. Despite alterations of the Z and X
series, the errorsin this equationmay still exhibit autocorrelation. Ifthey
do, the standard errors ofthe coefficients may be biased. To remove that
autocorrelation and resulting bias, a generalized least-squares procedure
may be used (see Theil 1971, p. 253, for a general description of the
procedure).
Themonthlydatafor theempiricalworkcomefrom severalsources, all
detailed in a data appendix. Most ofthe series coyer the period from the
late 1880s to mid-1914; the specific period for each series is listed in table
3.1. Mostoftheseriesexhibitedmarkedseasonality. Some also exhibited












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































sed on monthly dummy variables and trend terms. The residuals from
those equationswere used in subsequentsteps. These residuals shouldbe
trendless andfree ofseasonal effects. Table3.1 also presentsthemonthly
means and estimated-trend coefficients. These statistics, though a sec-
ondary feature of this paper, are of interest in themselves. Note the
unusually low average reserves and high average interest-earning assets
of the Bank during January-the most usual month for issuing financial
reports. Those averages apparently reflect the "window-dressing" in
which English banks ofthe period engaged. The practice involved boost-
ing gold andBankofEngland note holdings justbeforepublicstatements
of financial condition were to be issued. The higher reserve holdings
made the financial conditions of the banks appear more favorable to
depositors and others.
Table 3.2 presents the ARIMA equations used to generate the fore-
casts used as independent variables and the innovations used as depen-
dent variables in the final equations. The Z's represent the detrended
series with monthly means removed. L is a lag operator; i.e., .80L Zt =
.80Zt- 1 and .16L
5 Zt = .16Zt- 5. Thea's are residuals thatare assumedto
be "white noise." A variable is a white-noise series if the value of the
variable at time t is independent of its value in any other period. If an
equation in table 3.2 has "captured" all the explanatory power of the
variable's history in explaining its value in the present, then the residual
seriesin thatequationwill bewhite noise. The Q-statisticprobabilitieson
the right-hand side ofthe table are meantto answer the question: Whatis
the probability ofobtaining these residuals if they are from a white noise
series? The Q-statistics are computed using autocorrelation coefficients
ofthe residual series up through lags 6, 12, 18, and 24. The probabilities
reported are all well above .1, indicating that we cannot reject the
hypothesis that they are white noise. This fact demonstrates that the
equations of the table are good fits and do capture most ofthe explana-
tory power present in each variable's history.
One is led to ask why the particular lag structures oftable 3.2 show up
in the data. The low-orderlags are what one might expect, and they show
up fairly uniformly. The twelfth-order lags are also to be expected; they
represent a bit ofseasonality left in the data despite removal ofmonthly
means. The other scattered lag terms of the Bank-rate and -reserves
equations are harder to explain. I have been unable to divine any eco-
nomic explanation of their presence but have simply accepted them.
Before proceeding to report the results of the outlined procedures, I
note an additional, similar mode of estimating the feedback equations
described above. The use ofthe forecasting equations oftable 3.2 effec-
tively makes the policy variables into functions of lags of the target
variables, with specific lag structures imposed from prior information. It





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































structures, i.e., to enter the lagged target variables themselves (with
trend and monthly means removed) rather than the functions of those
variables reported in table 3.2. Results ofsuch an estimate procedure are
reported below. It follows in some respects a procedure outlined in
Nerlove, Grether, and Carvalho (1979, chap. 11).
3.4 Empirical Results
Table 3.3 reports coefficients for forecast variables regressed on the
transformed Bank-rate variable. As expected from the descriptive litera-
ture onBankpolicy, boththe reserve level and the proportionshowed up
as strong influences on Bank rate. The relationship in each case was
consistently negative, indicating that Bank rate was raised in response to
low values ofthose variables and vice versa. Apparently the reserve level
and the proportion are highly correlated; as a result, when both appear
together in an equation, the effect of neither can be measured with
precision. When they appear separately, however, each evidences statis-
tically significant coefficients.
Domestic economic activity was enteredin some equations in the form
ofrailway freight receipts and in othersin the form ofthe unemployment
rate. The former had consistently positive coefficients and the latter
consistently negative ones. Both types indicate that Bank rate rose when
activity was high and dropped when it was low. The level of statistical
significance ofthecoefficientsvaried somewhat. Thecoefficient ofunem-
ployment was always high relative to its standard error, but the coef-
ficient ofrailway receipts dropped when reserves or the proportion were
included in the equation. Possibly railway receipts were more closely
relatedto importsthanwas unemployment; ifthatwerethe case, itwould
be easier to estimate precisely a separate effect ofunemployment than it
would to estimate an effectfor activity as representedby railway receipts.
The rate of inflation also had significant coefficients in several of the
equations. Its positive sign apparently indicates that Bank rate rose in
response to high 'predicted rates of inflation and vice versa.
Table3.4reportsresults when thechange in Bankholdings ofdomestic
interest-bearing assets is the dependent variable. The relationship be-
tween that variable and changes in reserves is of particular interest
because ofthe emphasis Bloomfield (1959) and Nurkse (1944) placed on
it. The negative sign on reserve changes (measured here as predicted
reserves less actual reserves in the previous month, both adjusted for
trend and seasonality) indicates that Bank securities holdings generally
increased when reserves were predicted to fall, and vice versa. An
increase in those security holdings, other things equal, would lead to an
increase in Bank of England notes and gold held by commercial banks
and the public, and to an increase in the domestic money supply. The187 The Bank of England and the Rules of the Game
increase would tendto counteract any decrease caused by thewithdrawal
of reserves to the foreign sector. Thus the Bank at least in part seems to
have sterilized the effects ofinternational money flows on the domestic
supply of money. As an alternative approach to the Bank's reactions, I
estimatesimilarequationsusing goldinflows ratherthanreservechanges.
The results, reported in equations 6 through 9, are similar to those
described above, though the significance level of the coefficients is sub-
stantiallylower. Goldinflows, which would normallysuggest money-sup-
ply increases, led the Bank to respond by selling off securities, thus
countering some or all of the change in the supply of money.
In none ofthe equations oftable 3.4 was eitherofthe activity variables
significant. The rate of price change, however, appears to be nearly
significant. Its positive coefficient indicates that expected increases in
prices led to higher Bank holdings of interest-earning assets. The re-
sponse, ifcorrectlymeasured, is a procyclical one; thatis, higherinflation
appears to cause the Bank to expand the British supply of money. This
procyclical response contrasts with the apparently countercyclical re-
sponse reported in table 3.3.
The reserve level was also included in several equations. It had no
significant effect in the reserve-change equations, though its coefficients
were always positive. When gold inflows were substituted for reserve
changes, the reserve level almost assumed statistical significance. Its
positive coefficient indicates that the higher the reserves, the greater the
inflow of interest-bearing securities into the Bank's portfolio, other
things equal.
Table 3.5 contains results ofstepwise regressions paralleling the equa-
tions of table 3.3. These regressions are estimated by allowing indepen-
dent variables to enter the equations in order of statistical significance.
Onlyvariables significant at the 0.15 level were included in the equations
of table 3.5. The independent variables in these equations are lagged
values of the detrended, deseasonalized series. Entering lagged values
directly avoids imposing a lag structure of the sort imposed in using the
ARIMA forecasting equations. The dependent variables are the same
"innovations" in Bank rate used for table 3.3.
Because ofthe loose specification ofthe equations, table 3.5 is harder
to interpret than table 3.3. However, it appears that reserves and/or the
proportion had the most significant overall effects on Bank rate. In each
case, the sum of the effects is negative. The fact that much of the effect
comes from lags of low order lends credibility to the results. The other
variable that seems significant is inflation. Its overall effect is positive, as
it was also in the table 3.3 equations. Neither of the activity variables
appears to be important, though lags 2 and 12 of the railway-receipts
variable enterequation3. Possibly the specification ofthe equation is too
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Table 3.5 Stepwise Regressions on Bank Rate
EQUATION 2 3
Explan- Reserves Lags 1-12
atory Reserves, Lags 1-5 Proportion Lags 1-12 Proportion Lags 1-12
Variables Rlwy Rcpts, Lags 1-12 Rlwy Rcpts, Lags 1-12 Rlwy Rcpts, Lags 1-12
Entered Inflation, Lags 1-12 Inflation, Lags 1-12 Inflation, Lags 1-12
Reserves Reserves
Variablesa Lag 1 - .0865 (6.08) Lag 1 - .0989 (7.04)
2 .0578 (3.56) 2 .0609 (3.83)
Significant 4 .0411 (2.57) 4 .0289 (2.38)
5 - .0210 (1.50) 7 .0391 (2.49)
at 0.15 8 - .0482 (3.28)
Level Proportion Proportion
Lag 1 - .0218 (3.75) Lag 6 - .0234 (3.90)
4 .0127 (1.89) 10 .0134 (1.87)
6 - .0163 (2.35) 11 .0125 (1.82)
11 - .0157 (2.92)
Railway Receipts Railway Receipts Railway Receipts
None Significant None Significant Lag 2 .0012 (1.57)
12 - .0014 (1.93)
Inflation Inflation Inflation
Lag 1 .448 (2.19) Lag 1 .372 (1.75) Lag 1 .356 (1.76)
7 .591 (2.91) 5 - .471 (2.17) 5 - .507 (2.40)
11 .543 (2.64) 7 .417 (1.91) 6 .431 (2.01)
11 .468 (2.17) 11 .344 (1.69)
R
2 0.24 0.19 0.32
at-statistics in parentheses following coefficients. Intercept included but not shown.
serves and/or the proportion. Of course, if either appeared significant
despite the loose structure, then the hypothesis that the Bankengaged in
countercyclical policy would have been strengthened.
3.5 Interpretation
The question addressed in the paper is: Did the Bank of England
follow the rules ofthe gold standard game? The answer, insofar as it can
begiven, is a soft-spoken no. The rules, at leastin spirit, required that the
Bank not react countercyclically to domestic activity or price changes.
The results of the equations oftable 3.3 indicate that the Bank did react
countercyclically. The reaction is present even controlling for the effects
of reserves on Bank policy, suggesting that the domestic-activity and
price-change variables are not simply acting as proxies for reserves in the
equations. Those variables appear to have had direct effects on Bank
policy independent of their indirect effects via reserves. This finding192 John Dutton
conflicts with the beliefs of several previous analysts (e.g., Ford 1962;
Bloomfield 1959) that the Bank did not engage in countercyclical policy
ofany sort. Onthe otherhand, the finding is supportedby much descrip-
tive literature, which frequently mentions the Bank's sensitivity to the
effects of its policies on the domestic economy.
Table 3.3 suggests that the effects ofreserves and the proportion were
strongest. They showed up consistently and generally had the highest
levels of statistical significance. This suggests that whatever domestic
cyclical variables affected Bank behavior, they were outweighed by the
need to maintain convertibility of the currency. The conclusion is also
supported by the less constrained equations of table 3.5; there reserves
and the proportion show up as the most significant variables and with
low-order lag structures ofthe type that seem most reasonable. Thus it is
necessary to speak softly ofBank rule-breaking; the results ofthe Bank-
rate equations indicate a strong preoccupation with convertibility.
Table 3.4 also supports a negative answer to the question: Did the
Bank follow the rules? Bank-reserve decreases seem to have led to
increases in Bank holdings ofinterest-earning assets. Instead ofamplify-
ing theeffects ofreserve changesonthemoneysupply, theBankseemsto
have sterilized them. The sterilization mayor may not have been inten-
tional. Bloomfield (1959) described Bankpolicy with respect to its secur-
ities holdings as somewhatpassive; demandsfor additionalliquiditywere
met by passively acceding to requests for additional discounting.
Whether passive or active in the process, the Bank apparently acted as a
bufferbetweenreserve movements andmoney-supplychanges. Therules
would demand that it be an amplifier.
The Bank at least to some extent seems to have violated the rules, yet
theinternationalmonetarysystemwas stable. WeretheBank'sviolations
too minorto be important? Orwere the rules themselves unimportantfor
the adjustment process? Must we rely on the unsatisfying attribution of
stability to blind luck, the confluence of fortuitous circumstances?
Appendix Data Sources
Sources for the monthly data used are Goodhart (1972, appendixes VA
and VB), the U.S. National Monetary Commission statistics volume on
the United Kingdom, Germany, and France (1910), and some National
Bureau of Economic Research data sheets kindly supplied me by Anna
Schwartz. The latter include price data based on a 1928 Journal ofthe
Royal Statistical Society article ("Wholesale Prices of Commodities")
attributed to "the Editorofthe 'Statist'," and unemployment data taken
from the British Abstract ofLabour Statistics. The unemployment data193 The Bank of England and the Rules of the Game
are based on returns collected by the Board ofTrade and the Ministry of
Labourfrom trade unions payingunemployment benefits. Theprice data
are based on price indexes for forty-five commodities computed by
Augustus Sauerbeck; the overall index is a simple arithmetic average of
the individual ones. As such, it suffers from obvious weaknesses. How-
ever, I have been unable to locate an alternative monthly index.
The sources of the data used are listed below.
Bank rate, Banking Department reserves, and the proportion: January
1888-June 1891, U.S. National Monetary Commission 1910; July 1891-
June 1914, Goodhart 1972.
Railway receipts ("average weekly gross goods receipts ofmajor British
Rlys"): January 1893-June 1914, Goodhart 1972. The March and April
1912 figures were substantially lowered by a coal strike; because the
effect on domestic activity was likely much less drastic, I have substituted
higher numbers (1182 and 1161) for those two months.
Unemployment rates: January 1887-June 1914, NBER data sheets.
Price index: January 1885-June 1914, "Wholesale Prices" 1928.
Securities holdings: January 1888-December 1909, U.S. National
Monetary Commission 1910. This series consists of the sum of govern-
ment securities in both Bank departments, plus "other securities" in the
Banking Department.
Gold inflows: July 1891-June 1914, Goodhart 1972. The series used is
that attributed to the Bank of England.
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Comment Donald E. Moggridge
The phrase "rules of the game" only came into the economist's vocabu-
lary as theinterwargold standardnearedits end. So far as I can ascertain,
the termwas first used by Sir RobertKindersley, a directorofthe Bankof
England, on February 1930 in the course ofhis evidence to the Commit-
tee on Finance and Industry (United Kingdom 1931b, question 1595).
The phrase attracted Keynes's attention and found its way into his
"private evidence" to the committee two weeks later (Keynes 1981, p.
42) and subsequently into the committee's report (United Kingdom,
Committee on Finance and Industry 1931a, pars. 46-47).
Between Kindersley's coining of the phrase and the present the exact
meaning ofthe "rules" has varied. For Keynes, they meant that "you so
conduct your affairs that you tend neither to gain nor to lose large
quantities ofgold" (Keynes 1981, p. 42). The Macmillan committee was
even more general when it argued:
It is difficult to define in precise terms what is implied by the "rules of
the game". The management ofan internationalstandard is an art and
not a science, and no one would suggest that it is possible to draw up a
formal code of action, admitting of no exceptions and qualifications,
adherence to which is obligatory on peril ofwrecking the whole struc-
ture. Much must necessarily be left to time and circumstance. (United
Kingdom, Committee on Finance and Industry 1931a, par. 47)
Nevertheless, when economists have come to assess the possible reasons
for the successorfailure offixed-exchange-rate regimes, andoccasionally
even more "flexible" ones (Chisholm 1979), they have often specified a
set of rules conducive to the stability of the regime and tested for the
relevant authorities' adherence or nonadherence thereto. The most
famous of these exercises are those of Nurkse (1944) and Bloomfield
(1959) for the interwar and pre-1914 gold standard periods. Both men
tested a relatively activist rule that internationally equilibrating behavior
would move central banks' foreign and domestic assets in the same
direction as they reinforced the impactofreserve movements onfinancial
Donald E. Moggridge is professor of economics at Scarborough College, University of
Toronto, West Hill, Ontario.196 John Dutton
markets. Inbothcases, using annual data, theyfound adherencetosuch a
rule was the exception rather than the norm. Alternative suggestions for
rules have been provided by Bloomfield (1959, 1968) and Michaely
(1968). The former suggested that behavior would be equilibrating if
central banks did not offset the effects of reserve changes or if their
discount rate moved inversely with their reserve holdings or reserve
ratios. The latter suggested that suitable behavior would see the money
supply varying directly and the central-bank discount rate moving in-
versely with reserve changes. Bloomfield only chose to test his discount-
rate rule during the pre-1914 period while Michaely's rule was applied to
theBrettonWoodsperiod. Doubtlessonecould also presentanotherrule
involving relative rates of change of a suitable monetary aggregate and
apply it to the pre-1914 period, but as yet I know of no such exercise.
John Dutton's paper brings to the discussion of the observance or
nonobservance ofthe rulesofthegame by the pre-warBankofEnglanda
new twist to the rules and a new test of observance of the Nurkse-
Bloomfield reinforcement rule-and incidentally a check on the more
passive no-offsetting and discount-rate rules. Dutton's new twist states
that given equilibrating central-bank behavior under classical gold stan-
dard conditions, one would not observe central banks pursuing counter-
cyclical policies. Onecan see the sense ofsuch a rule in the abstract, for it
would mean that the banks involved would avoid meeting potentially
destabilizing dilemma cases and it would incidentally economize on the
need for international reserves. However, I wonder whether it is an
appropriate rule for the pre-1914 international economy given that
Bloomfield (1959, p. 38), Morgenstern (1959, chap. 2) and Triffin (1964,
chap. 1) have all noted the strong parallelism in movements ofeconomic
activity during the period. In such circumstances, nonadherence to the
rule might still be consistent with the successful operation of the stan-
dard.
As well as providinga possible new rule, Dutton'spapertests the Bank
of England's observance of various rules in a new form. Rather than
simply comparing the authorities' actual behavior to the rules, he pro-
poses a more complex model in which the Bank reacts to forecasts ofits
possible target variables (the Banking Department reserve, the propor-
tion, domestic activity, prices and gold movements) by altering the level
of its discount rate and its domestic assets. The rationale for this more
involved procedure is twofold. First the Bank might not have full in-
formation as to the most recentvalues ofits targetvariables atthe time of
making policy adjustments, and second, the procedure eliminates some
problems of simultaneous-equation bias.
Leavingthesecondreason tooneside, I cannotfully see thestrengthof
Dutton's first procedural rationalization. It is true, given Dutton's-and
Charles Goodhart's (1972)-problemoffinding a good monthly index of197 The Bank of England and the Rules of the Game
activity, that the Bank was unlikely to have had full information on that
score. The same would almost certainly be the case as regards the price
level. But why Dutton should think that the Bank did not have full
information about its own reserve, its proportion, and gold movements
strikes me as odd, given the information the governors received each
working day at the daily "books" meeting (Sayers 1976, 1: p. 31). Thus it
would seem to me that the justification for Dutton's technique must
depend moreonthe usefulness ofthe new rule he wishes to test andonits
statistical characteristics than onits being representative ofthe details of
Bank behavior. This is particularly the case when the forecasting model
assumes that the Bank had information on each variable's behavior over
the entire period and used the same processes consistently. Bothofthese
assumptions seem to me suspect, for the seasonal variability of certain
matters such as internal drains changed over the period (Sayers 1976, 1:
p. 32) and it is clearfrom the narrative material available that the Bank's
procedures and techniques, as well as the balance among the latter, were
changing markedly over the twenty-five years before 1914. Thus it would
seem to me that one cannot really be certain exactly what Dutton's
procedures are capturing at the end of the day.
What appears to be going on is thatthe Bankreactedmost markedlyto
the traditional stimuli, changes in the level ofits reserves and the propor-
tion, and in the expected direction. One would expect these reactions;
they would be consistent with one Bloomfield rule and part of the
Michaelyruleofthegame. Thereis as well theconfirmationoftheinverse
relationship between changes in the Bank's reserves and its holding of
securities that one might expect given Bloomfield's evidence on annual
datathat theBankfollowed the reinforcing rule ofthegame justless than
half the time between 1880 and 1914 (Bloomfield 1959, p. 50). What we
do notknow is whetherthis offsettingwas partialas Bloomfieldsuggested
(1959, p. 50) orcomplete-whethertheBankwas merely inclined to lean
againstthewindorstandresolutely againstit. Theformer might bewithin
the spirit ofa possible rule, given its Bank-rate reaction, while the latter
would represent a violation of the rules in almost any common formula-
tion. Nor do we know, although the Bank did, how much offsetting was
an automaticreflection ofthe discount marketbeingforced into theBank
and how much reflected deliberate policy. Perhapssome day the Bankor
some private scholars will extract the necessary information from the
"books" and thus help remove another puzzle. Finally we have the
suggestion that the Bank responded countercyclically to the activity and
price variables, something that Bloomfield (1959, p. 33) regarded as
incidental and Ford (1962, p. 34) believed was not a conscious policy at
all, although narrative accounts ofthe Bank's behavior have understood
it as a subsidiary but growing preoccupation. Whether this behavior
reflected a continuing but changing Bank concern or the long-standing198 John Dutton
suggestionthatgiventhepowerofBankratethemoney-supplyprocessin
Britain was to some extent endogenous (Ford 1962, p. 36; Goodhart
1972, chap. 15) is not pursued in this paper, concerned as it is with the
rules of the game.
Thus the paper leaves us in the position of confirming the Bank's
adherence to some rules and suggesting violations of others. Perhaps
further work by Dutton will clarify the extent of these violations, espe-
cially of the no-offsetting rule, and indicate whether the Bank became
more inclined to violate some rules over time-perhaps because it did
become more concerned about levels ofeconomic activity. For the pres-
ent we can thank Dutton for the questions he has raised and hope that
discussion and more work will help us come to find answers.
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Reply John Dutton
I would like to respond to two points in Professor Moggridge's "Com-
ment."
First, he indicates concern that the behavior of the Bank of England
varied substantially over the twenty-seven years studied. He is also
bothered by the possibility of changes in seasonal and other patterns in
the target variables over the period and by the effects those changes
might have on the forecasting equations. I share those concerns and so
have attempted to allay them. Tables C3.1 and C3.2 contain linear
feedback equations, similar to those of tables 3.3 and 3.4, but for two
shorter periods. Some changes in the coefficients appear. However, the
earlier findings for the whole period remain intact in the results for the
two subperiods. Bank rate in each subperiod reacted negatively to re-
serves, positively to economic activity, and positively to inflation. The
reserve variable is clearly significant in each case (although its coefficient
is much greater for the second period). The activity variables give much
the same results as those for the whole period. Unemployment has a
significant, or nearly significant, negative effect; railway receipts show a
weak but consistently positive effect. Inflation has statistically significant
positive coefficients for the first period but not the second.
Likewise, in both periods, securities holdings of the Bank tend to
change in the opposite direction from predicted reserve changes. Secu-
rities appear to have decreased about one-half to two-thirds as much as
the change in reserves. This decrease is consistent with results for the
whole period, indicating that the processes governing the Bankprobably
did not change dramatically between the two periods.
Moggridge mentions concern that seasonal patterns of the variables
changed over the twenty-seven years ofthe study. Figures C3.1 and C3.2
contain plots ofmonthly means ofseveral variables for periods ending in
1900 and beginning in 1901. The patterns for the two periods seem
remarkably similar. Gold inflows evidence the largest change (as well as
largestandarddeviationsfor themeans). Unemploymentpatternsduring
the first quarter of the two subperiods differ somewhat. The overall
impression, however, is of substantial likeness between the overall sea-
sonal patterns.
Professor Moggridge rightly worries about stability of the forecasting200 John Dutton
Table C3.1 Bank-rate Equations
Rlwy
Reserves Rcpts Unemp Autoregressive
Equationa N
b x 10-2 X 10-3 X 10-2 Inflation Termsc
First Period (through 1900)
1. (1893) 96 -1.34 4.01 none
(1.82) (1.01)
2. (1893) 96 -1.10 4.87 2.40 none
(1.47) (1.23) (1.59)
3. (1888) 156 -1.45 -3.49 lag 7, .14(1.73)
(1.95) (1.83) lag 10, - .14(1.80)
4. (1888) 156 -1.28 -3.12 2.18 lag 7, .15(1.87)
(1.75) (1.65) (2.03) lag 10, - .14(1.80)
5. (1888) 156 -1.81 lag 10, - .16(2.08)
(2.23)
Second Period (through 1914)
6. (1901) 162 -18.42 1.70 lag 1, .13(1.68)
(6.19) (1.05)
7. (1901) 162 -18.46 1.73 0.25 lag 1, .13(1.70)
(6.18) (1.07) (0.39)
8. (1901) 162 -18.37 -3.79 lag 1, .15(1.99)
(6.37) (2.53)
9. (1901) 162 -18.43 -3.84 0.34 lag 1, .18(2.02)
(6.39) (2.56) (0.55)
10. (1901) 162 -18.50 none
(5.92)
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.
aDate in parentheses is beginning year.
bN = number of observations.
cIndicated are lag number of autoregressive error term, estimated autocorrelation coef-
ficient used in data transformation, and t-statistic of parameter.
Table C3.2 Securities-Holdings Equations
a
Reserve Forecast






Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.
aThe errors in this equation showed no statistically significant autocorrelation.
Securities changes measured in thousand-pound units, reserves in million-pound units.
Coefficient x 10-
1 indicates portion of reserves changes offset.201 The Bank of England and the Rules of the Game
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Fig. C3.1 BankofEngland financial variables, means, by months, 1888-
1900 and 1901-14. Earlierandlaterperiodvalues areindicated
by broken and solid lines, respectively. Source: See section
3.6.
process over the whole period in question. The ARIMA forecasting
equations are at best only rough proxies for the Bank's forecasts. One
would expect the coefficients on these rough proxies to be biased toward
zero. That significant coefficients are obtained for the period as a whole
and for the two subperiods seems to indicate that the ARIMA forecasts
are doing their proxying job reasonably well.
The second ofMoggridge's concerns to which I should like to respond
is the validity of the no-countercyclical-activity rule ofthe game used in
the paper. The rule seems reasonable to me because the Bank, with
limited policy tools, would have needed to concentrate its efforts on the
single majorgoal ofmaintaining convertibility. Efforts atcountercyclical
policy would likely have interfered with pursuit ofthat goal. They might202 John Dutton
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U.K. railway receipts, unemployment rate, and gold flows,
means, by months, 1888-1900 and 1901-14. Source: See fig.
C3.1.
also have had destabilizing effects. There is some reason to believe that
goldinflows, BankingDepartmentreserves, anddomesticactivity moved
together (see Pippenger, this volume). If they did, then countercyclical
Bank-rate policy would have tended to reinforce those cyclical move-
ments of gold and reserves, rather than tempering them.
Moggridge also suggests in his comment that the apparent countercy-
clical policy evidenced in my equations might have reflected a common
response ofBankrate andeconomic activity to some third variable. Such
apossibilitycannotbecompletelydismissed. Possiblecandidatevariables
are reserves and the money supply. However, if reserves and the money
supply were positively related to domestic activity, as seems likely, and
Bank rate negatively related to those two, then any indirect effect of
activity via reserves on Bank rate would be negative. The coefficients in
the paper consistently indicate a positive relationship. Other scenarios
for explaining the empirical results are ofcourse possible. It is plausible,
however, that the results could signify countercyclical actions on the part
of the Bank. In any case, Professor Moggridge is certainly correct in
calling for more work to reduce the extent of uncertainty about the
Bank's policies.